2006 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

2-9-2006

USA v. Seal

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Seal" (2006). 2006 Decisions. 1614.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1614

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No: 04-1101

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DANIEL J. SEAL, II,
Appellant

_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00172-1)
District Judge: Honorable Clarence C. Newcomer
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on November 7, 2005
BEFORE: ROTH, FUENTES and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed:

February 9, 2006)

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Daniel Seal appeals the judgment of conviction of the District Court and its denial
of his motion for a mistrial and he challenges his sentence under United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). For the following reasons we will affirm the conviction, vacate the
sentence and remand for sentencing, pursuant to Booker.
On March 12, 2003, a grand jury returned an indictment against Seal charging him
with one count of conspiracy to tamper with a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371
and three counts of witness tampering and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1512 (b)(1) and 2. On June 25, 2003, a jury found Seal guilty of conspiracy and of
two counts of witness tampering. On January 5, 2004, the District Court sentenced Seal
to 21 months imprisonment, a term of supervised release of two years, a $10,000 fine, and
a special assessment of $300. Seal appealed and, on March 17, 2005, applied for relief
under Booker.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal from a final judgment of conviction
and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Daniel Seal, an attorney, was charged along with his client, Nicholas Paz,with
conspiracy to tamper with a witness. Seal was representing Paz on charges of bank
robbery, for which Paz admitted his guilt and cooperated against his co-defendant Harvey
Clanton. Paz and Clanton were both housed at the Federal Detention Center in
Philadelphia but were separated so they could not communicate with each other. While
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representing Paz, Seal met with Clanton on two occasions, both without the permission of
Clanton’s lawyer.

At the first meeting Seal told Clanton that he had a message from his

client and showed Clanton a note signed by Paz. During this meeting, Seal and Clanton
discussed a supposed drug deal involving Paz, Clanton, and a mob figure named Joe
Ligambi. Seal told Clanton that Paz was going to tell the government the story about
Ligambi. Clanton informed Seal that, although the story was false, he would consider
going along with it. Clanton also asked Seal for more details and Seal agreed to provide
them. Seal’s handwritten notes from this meeting contain a reminder that stated he had to
get the story to “Baz.” Baz is Clanton’s nickname.
At a proffer interview of Paz conducted by FBI Special Agent Vito Roselli, Paz
told the government the story about Ligambi to further his supposed cooperation with the
government. Some time later, Seal was interviewed by FBI Special Agent Thompson. At
trial, Agent Thompson testified that during the interview Seal admitted that the purpose of
the second meeting with Clanton was to influence what he was going to say to the
government at his proffer. Based on this information, Seal was found guilty of conspiring
with his client to tamper with a witness and of two counts of witness tampering. This
appeal followed.
Seal appeals his conviction and sentence on five grounds: (1) the District Court
erred in dismissing a hold-out juror in favor of the defense and in proceeding with 11
jurors; (2) the District Court erred in providing insufficient jury instructions regarding a
corrupt witness; (3) the District Court erred in permitting the government to use and refer
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to ethical violations to infer wrong doing by Seal; (4) the District Court erred in
enhancing the guidelines range for perjury; (5) the District Court erred by enhancing
Seal’s guidelines range for use of a special skill. Seal also challenges his sentence under
United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct at 738. Specifically, he points out that his fourth and
fifth grounds for appeal were made prior to Booker but would now be considered Booker
claims. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand this case to the District Court for resentencing in line with Booker.
We review the dismissal of a juror for cause pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 949 (3d
Cir. 1986). Seal’s argument that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing
juror number six without a determination that he was unwilling to follow the law is not
convincing. Under Rule 23 (b), a court is permitted to excuse a juror for just cause and to
allow a verdict to be determined by the remaining 11 jurors. In the present case, juror
number six, in complete disregard of the court’s instructions, consulted an extraneous
source for the definition of several legal terms, including entrapment, an issue that was
not part of the case. Furthermore, the juror intentionally concealed a printout of the
definition by placing it in a newspaper, enabling him to smuggle it into the deliberation
room; he then proceeded to read the definition to the other jurors. Under these
circumstances the court did not abuse its discretion in removing the juror without a
determination that he was unwilling to follow the law. See id.
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Furthermore, subsequent to the removal of juror number six, the court conducted
an inquiry of the remaining jurors to ensure that there was no possibility of any taint, bias,
or prejudice as a result of the impermissible materials. Seal was provided an opportunity
to question the remaining jurors but chose not to do so. As such, the District Court did
not abuse its discretion by deciding to proceed with an eleven member jury.
Seal’s next argument is that the District Court erred in providing deficient jury
instructions regarding a corrupt witness. Because he did not object to the jury
instructions at trial, the instructions will be reviewed for plain error. See United States v.
Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 544-545 (3d Cir. 2001). In United States v. Isaac, we held that
there is no per se rule requiring a specific jury instruction with regard to a cooperating
witness. 134 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 1998). Moreover, we concluded that District Courts are
given “wide discretion” when charging the jury. Id. at 205, (citing United States v. Smith,
789 F.2d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 1986)).
In the present case, the District Court did not commit plain error in its instruction
to the jury. The court reminded the jury that the cooperating witness, Harvey Clanton,
had entered a guilty plea agreement and that the testimony of such witnesses should be
scrutinized with caution. The District Court told the jury to give the testimony of the
cooperating witness such weight as they feel it deserves. These instructions, along with
the testimony of the cooperating witness as to his plea agreement, were sufficient to put
the jury on notice that it should weigh Clanton’s testimony carefully.
Seal next argues that the District Court erred in permitting the government to use
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and refer to ethical violations to infer wrong doing by him. The District Court granted a
pretrial defense motion to preclude any mention of Rule 4.2 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct. Seal argues that the District Court erred in allowing the
government to introduce evidence of both (1) his knowledge of ethics rules in state and
federal court and (2) evidence of his continuing legal education courses because both
types of evidence were irrelevant and because they were introduced in violation of the
court’s pretrial order.
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in deeming this
evidence admissible. The District Court properly admitted the evidence demonstrating
Seal’s knowledge of legal ethics rules; this evidence was relevant since it helped to show
intent, one of the necessary elements to prove a witness tampering charge. Furthermore,
this evidence was relevant to counter the defense’s argument that Seal’s lack of federal
practice experience prevented him from forming the requisite intent to commit the crimes
with which he was charged. The District Court also properly admitted evidence of
appellant’s continuing legal education classes because this evidence helped to show
appellant’s experience and intent to commit the crimes.
Seal’s final two challenges will be addressed simultaneously since both are
considered claims under United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct at 738. He challenges his
sentence based on two sentence enhancements determined by the District Court. These
enhancements placed Seal in a sentencing range of 21-27 months. It appears from the
District Court’s decision that the judge treated the sentencing guidelines as mandatory.
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As such, we find that Seal’s sentence is in violation of Booker. Id. Therefore, we will
remand the case to the District Court for re-sentencing. See United States v. Davis, 407
F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2005).
For the above mentioned reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction,
vacate the sentence, and remand the case to the District Court for re-sentencing in line
with Booker.
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